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Arguments over what characteristics constituted historical 
Progressivism, and the Progressive spirit, are commonplace among 
historians. However, it seems universally conceded that the politics 
of  the late 19th and early 20th centuries in the United States were 
characterized by groups organized around specific issues to promote 
reform legislation, as well as by an increasing appeal to expertise – 
particularly expertise in the nascent social sciences. The American 
Association for Labor Legislation (AALL) sat at a peculiar nexus of  
these domains. It began as a group of  social scientists, dedicated by 
and large to careers in economics. Yet they behaved in many ways 
like other Progressive reformers, publicly advocating for very specific 
policy positions and even drafting potential legislation. They pushed a 
new and active role for the academic social scientist.
In addition to its backward-looking historical valence as a new 
development in professional social science, the AALL also had a 
forward-looking valence as an extra-academy public policy research 
institution composed of  academic researchers. That is, the AALL was 
one of  the first organizations that might be classified as a think tank. 
The appellation of  first think tank is usually given to the Brookings 
Institute, the forerunner to which was founded in 1916.1 Given 
the subsequent development of  that region of  the public sphere, it 
is probably correct to say so. The AALL, however, was a historical 
alternative to the Brookings model of  the think tank. Organized as a 
quasi-professional association rather than a foundation entrusted by 
philanthropists or corporate interests, the leaders of  the AALL viewed 
policy involvement as an aim and requirement of  academic social 
science. They justified this stance with a belief  that academic research 
in the social sciences would be able to reach effective consensus – a 
belief, generated by a number of  historical causes, which would prove 
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not to be long-lasting. In the end the AALL could not sustain its claims 
to represent professional consensus, academia did not displace other 
players in the public policy sphere, and academic positions became a 
matter of  personal reputation rather than professional license. The 
failure of  the AALL’s mission highlights important trends within 
Progressive reform.
the literature:
A few extended treatments of  the AALL have been published. 
The most extensive is David A. Moss’s Socializing Security: Progressive-
Era Economists and the Origins of  American Social Policy.2 Prior to that, 
the most comprehensive had been a 1953 University of  Wisconsin 
doctoral dissertation, by Lloyd F. Pierce, entitled “The Activities of  
the American Association for Labor Legislation in Behalf  of  Social 
Security and Protective Labor Legislation.”3 As the title implies, Pierce 
focused more on producing a chronicle than an analysis of  those 
activities. The most extensive scholarly analysis, prior to Moss, had 
been one complete chapter, and portions of  others, in Theda Skocpol’s 
Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of  Social Policy in the 
United States.4 While many books have been written about the origins 
of  welfare legislation in the United States, these treat the AALL most 
fully.
By and large, they hew fairly close to the details, not offering an excess 
of  interpretation. Pierce’s dissertation in particular does little more 
than narrate the events of  the organization’s history. Skocpol treats 
the AALL as a classic “investigate-educate-legislate” reform activist 
group, not dominated by corporate interest but fitting neatly into the 
middle-class “elite expert” model. Her last word on them appears to 
be that “…the predominantly male experts of  the AALL leadership 
remained entranced by their view of  politics as a rational conversation 
among elites.”5 Moss’s book, meanwhile, finds the AALL’s significance 
to be its ahead-of-the-times advocacy of  social insurance, a dream that 
would come to partial fruition in the New Deal. For these three authors 
the historical importance of  the AALL lies mostly in the policies it 
advocated, and much less in its structure and self-conception.
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Three books dominate the literature on the late-19th century rise 
of  social science in the United States. The first, Thomas Haskell’s 
Emergence of  Professional Social Science, documents the rise and decline 
of  the American Social Science Association.6 Thus, it takes place 
immediately prior to the period of  the AALL, which began in 1906. 
Haskell, building heavily on Robert Wiebe, advances two principal 
theses. The first is that professional social science emerged in response 
to an intellectual crisis generated by industrialization, growing social 
“interdependence,” and a decline in a naïve faith in the perfectly free 
individual. Secondly, this new and complicated world needed specialized 
communities of  inquiry to research, understand, and explain social 
processes.7 Thus, social science was profoundly rooted in both a social 
and an intellectual shift.
The other two books place more weight, comparatively speaking, 
on social than on intellectual factors. Mary O. Furner’s Advocacy and 
Objectivity has a slightly more contemporaneous timeline than Haskell’s 
book, as well as a slightly more institutional perspective. She concludes 
that “The academic professionals, having retreated to the security 
of  technical expertise, left to journalists and politicians the original 
mission – the comprehensive assessment of  industrial society…”8 On 
this analysis, late-19th century political disputes gave way to a narrow 
consensus which could both address policy questions and avoid the 
specter of  class conflict (or of  conflict with benefactors). Dorothy 
Ross, in The Origins of  American Social Science, finds that social science 
has historically rested on a belief  in American exceptionalism – that 
is, the idea that the United States has at least partially uncovered a 
special way of  organizing society which exempts it from the historical 
impediments faced by countries in Europe and elsewhere. Thus, U.S. 
social science has a scientistic quality, rejecting as it does the need for 
close historical scrutiny of  empirical claims.9
Finally, there is the literature on the public policy research industry. 
The history of  the think tank has been less well-explored than that 
of  Progressive-era reform organizations or social sciences. However, 
valuable work can be found. James G. McGann, in “The Competition 
for Dollars, Scholars, and Influence in the Public Policy Research 
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Industry,” ably synthesizes the sociological and policy research on the 
think tank, while providing a brief  historical chapter.10 McGann also 
provides a clear set of  characteristics delineating different sorts of  
public policy research organizations from each other – independence 
and funding structure, for example.11 Edward Silva and Sheila Slaughter, 
on the other hand, focus on the political influences involved in shaping 
academic participation in the policy world in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries. They largely follow Furner in believing that the academy 
constricted the range of  available opinion in response to pressure from 
moneyed interests.12 As a whole, the public policy research literature 
has put forward a vision of  politicized ideology as the driving factor 
behind think tanks and the knowledge they produce.
If  we consider these three domains – Progressive reform group, 
professionalizing social science department, and nascent public policy 
think tank – the American Association for Labor Legislation sits nearly, 
though not neatly, at the intersection. Not neatly, because key qualities 
of  each category distinguish it from the others. Most importantly, the 
members of  the AALL retained a faith in their organization to act 
as the professional arbiter of  social-scientific knowledge, rather than 
as a participant in oppositional, competitive debate. That is not to 
minimize the disagreements which took place within the group, but 
to note that the economists, sociologists, and political scientists of  
the day operated under an expectation of  eventual expert consensus. 
This faith in consensus exemplified the belief, sometimes held up as a 
quintessentially Progressive ideal, in the perfectibility of  society. If  any 
organization were to take up the Progressive mantle into the middle 
space between ivory tower and public square, it ought to have been 
the AALL. That the mantle was taken up by other models of  public 
policy, which drew from academia for personal credential rather than 
professional cachet, suggests a weakness – or at least a complication – 
in the perfectibility theory of  Progressivism.
a Brief timeline Of the aall:
The International Association for Labor Legislation had been active 
for a number of  years in 1906, with Carroll D. Wright (the president 
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of  the American Statistical Society) as its U.S. correspondent, when a 
group of  academic economists decided to form a dedicated American 
chapter. The initial group included Richard T. Ely, Henry R. Seager, 
Henry Farnam, William F. Willoughby, and John R. Commons. While 
not an economist, noted law professor Ernst Freund was highly 
involved. A number of  professional social scientists with government 
jobs, such as Adna F. Weber and I.M. Rubinow, joined also.13 Members 
of  the General Administrative Council included Jane Addams, Samuel 
Gompers (though he would part ways), Florence Kelley, and Louis 
Brandeis. Beginning with thirty-five, membership expanded by the 
early 1910s to around 3,000, staying roughly there until the group’s 
demise in 1945. The presidency tended to rotate among the various 
economists, but the full-time secretary ended up having the most 
impact on the organization. John B. Andrews, a PhD student of  
Commons and Ely’s at the University of  Wisconsin along with his 
wife Irene, served as secretary from 1908 until the end.14 Beginning 
in 1911, the AALL began to publish a quarterly journal, the American 
Labor Legislation Review, which served not only as a forum for reformist 
academics but also as a clearinghouse for information on the progress 
of  legislation in the states and abroad.15
The AALL devoted itself  to concrete legislative reforms. Its first 
and most successful campaign resulted in the elimination of  the use 
of  poisonous phosphorus in matches, which had resulted in serious 
illness at match factories. This sort of  project is a good example of  
AALL advocacy – legislation on the subject from other countries 
was compiled and analyzed, and quantitative data were gathered to 
demonstrate the severity of  the “phossy-jaw” problem (as phosphorus 
poisoning was called).16 The AALL’s leaders and scholars mounted 
a multi-year campaign which included articles in its own journal, the 
American Labor Legislation Review, as well as editorial pieces in newspapers 
and magazines. The New York Times, for example, ran four articles 
on phossy-jaw referencing the AALL in 1911 and the beginning of  
1912.17 The campaign also included significant lobbying of  Congress 
and the president, which eventually resulted in the Esch Act of  1912. 
This law placed a prohibitive tax on the use of  white phosphorus in 
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industrial production, thereby shifting match producers to the use 
of  sesquisulphide, the next best alternative. In conjunction with the 
Esch Act, the AALL negotiated with the Diamond Match Company, 
first to allow the patent on sesquisulphide to be held in trust by a 
trio of  experts (consisting of  E.R.A. Seligman, the chief  attorney for 
the AFL, and the U.S. Commissioner of  Labor) – and then to waive 
the patent entirely.18 These negotiations eliminated the fear that a tax 
on white phosphorus would grant monopoly to those with access to 
sesquisulphide. The method of  scientific legislation appeared to be a 
grand success. A universally acknowledged labor problem had been 
resolved consensually with subtlety and concern for the operation of  
market forces.
The AALL’s other major cause was workmen’s compensation. The 
organization advocated for laws which would compensate workers 
for injuries suffered on the job, framing the idea as one of  corporate 
responsibility. Unemployment insurance, maximum hours laws, and 
minimum wage laws were also picked up as means of  ensuring adequate 
living conditions for workers. In these matters the AALL cooperated 
extensively with the National Consumers’ League.19 These campaigns 
were marked by the same methods as the phossy-jaw campaign, but 
they took place at the state rather than the federal level. Among other 
developments, state-by-state campaigning saw the AALL drafting 
“uniform bills” for multiple states to adopt simultaneously, in order 
to avoid what Moss refers to as “degenerative competition” between 
the states for labor.20 The AALL spent much time discussing the 
constitutionality of  these measures: whether they fell under the states’ 
police powers, whether the 19th century concept of  liability was still 
sufficient, etc.21 While AALL-penned articles lost no opportunities 
to skewer the courts for building law on unscientific theories, the 
organization also tailored their bills to fall within the Supreme Court’s 
bounds of  acceptability. Wages and hours bills applied mainly to 
women, for example, following Muller v. Oregon, though the economists 
of  the AALL advocated restrictions for all employers and employees.22
The AALL has been remembered primarily for being the first 
organization to mount a campaign for compulsory health insurance.23 
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Photograph of  Richard T. Ely (1854-1943), published in The 
Comrade, a New York newspaper, in 1903. 
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It began to advocate for this sort of  social insurance shortly before U.S. 
entry into World War I. In contrast with the anti-phosphorus campaign, 
the health insurance campaign resulted in almost total failure. The same 
methods were employed – a New York Times article noting the first 
bill’s introduction to the state says that they “distributed over 13,000 
copies of  the tentative bill” – but it was the AALL’s most controversial 
proposal to date. The same New York Times article, for example, refers 
to it as “one of  the most radical proposals in the interests of  the wage 
earner ever made in this country.”24 The campaigns were vigorous, but 
ultimately to no avail. 
the respOnsiBility Of the sOcial scientist:
In 1910, the association amended its constitutional statement of  
purpose to include the actual advancement of  “desirable” rather than 
merely “uniform” legislation. It did so against Ely’s and Commons’s 
advice, although both men went along with the new direction.25 This 
change coincided with John B. Andrews’s acceptance of  the secretary 
position. Having a full-time executive secretary allowed the organization 
to advance its political agenda with far more dedication, and the new 
mission – “To encourage the study of  labor conditions in the United 
States with a view to promoting desirable legislation” – gave it license 
to do so.26 All told, the organization took a major step “into the ring,” 
as it were, becoming on both of  those fronts less removed from the 
political fray. That is not, however, to say that the academics kept out 
of  advocacy, for the AALL’s new role allowed the other academics to 
advocate all the more strongly. The idea of  professorial involvement 
in the public square would come to be commonplace in later decades, 
and the AALL represents a crucial moment in that transition.
Some researchers, notably Furner, believe that the social science 
academic was effectively neutered by academic freedom controversies 
in the 1890s. Economists who had found themselves on the wrong 
end of  subversion charges felt entitled to undertake advocacy within 
“reasonable” content boundaries, but were unwilling to go further. 
Furner would interpret these changes as a highly correlated decline of  
professorial involvement and increase in advocacy. Certainly, Furner 
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demonstrates, Ely and Commons sharply restricted the range of  their 
political opinions following their academic freedom ordeals.  Yet even 
for those two, the forcefulness of  their advocacy for labor laws, their 
willingness to criticize the courts, and other noisy tendencies do not 
fit well with this interpretation. AALL members were not afraid to 
make nontechnical pronouncements about the role of  law in society, 
or the nature of  contract, or many other issues relevant to the cause 
of  labor. Very shortly after the events recounted in Advocacy and 
Objectivity, a laundry list of  academic economists – including Ely and 
Commons – could be found making pronouncements about the need 
for social science expertise to settle questions of  legislation. Nor were 
these merely radicals: Farnam in particular was known as an economic 
conservative.27
The question is more complicated than it might at first appear, 
because the advocacy of  the early 20th century was of  a different 
sort than that of  the late 19th. The AALL did not justify its advocacy 
negatively, by cautiously not stepping outside narrow disciplinary 
boundaries. Rather, the members of  the AALL found justification for 
policy advocacy in a different conception of  legislation. Government 
on their view fell properly within the domain of  the social sciences 
– to be informed, naturally, by experts well-versed in those sciences. 
Members of  the AALL were prolific writers, publishing often in a great 
number of  venues. Journal publications authored by the professors 
can be found in the American Journal of  Sociology, the American Political 
Science Review, The Survey, the American Economic Review, and most 
notably in the AALL’s own journal, the American Labor Legislation 
Review. These papers show a semi-public face of  the AALL, presented 
to the academic and labor reform worlds. Accordingly, they provide 
excellent examples of  the style and mode of  argumentation favored 
by the Association’s members. Many of  them, especially presidential 
remarks at annual meetings, address the questions of  the AALL’s role 
in promoting legislation specifically.
The overriding concern is, of  course, that the laws be improved. 
By the AALL’s understanding, this means that laws should have a 
scientific character, informed by “the facts” and by expert consensus. 
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As the Andrews couple wrote, “It will soon be recognized that the 
utilization of  all available knowledge and experience in securing 
intelligent regulations…is a problem worthy of  the most careful 
attention.”28 Farnam followed in the same vein, saying that “The first 
thing to emphasize is that every law should be preceded by a careful 
investigation of  the facts, economic, industrial, and medical.”29 Richard 
T. Ely was even more explicit when he addressed the first meeting of  
the AALL: “The International Association for Labor Legislation…
has as its special function the impartial scientific examination of  labor 
measures and investigation of  actual conditions underlying labor 
legislation…Its activities are directed by men trained in economics and 
they give a good idea of  the relation between economic theory and 
labor legislation.”30
Beyond promoting legislation of  a high quality, the members of  
the AALL saw themselves as an integral and necessary part of  the 
legislative process. “No one will question the propriety of  a discussion 
of  a program of  social legislation by this Association,” said Henry 
Seager, for “Unlike the Economic Association and the Sociological 
Society, it is committed by its very name to a program: the study and 
promotion of  wise labor laws.”31 In Adna F. Weber’s opinion, “the 
promotion of  labor legislation [has been] left mainly to the laboring 
classes without the assistance and guidance that they should have 
had from the professional classes,” which organizations such as the 
AALL could provide.32 Farnam, in a similar vein, referred to “…
our State legislation which is prodigious in its mass [but] is mainly 
the product of  unskilled labor.”33 In that sense, the AALL appointed 
itself  to help the state legislatures transition from unskilled to skilled 
labor. Farnam went on to analogize economic regulation to medicine, 
saying that economics had moved out of  the primitive past and could 
now be confidently and safely applied to social problems.34  Elsewhere, 
he was more explicit about what this would look like, expressing his 
optimism in the following trends: “Expert commissions are being 
used more and more. The development of  such an institution as the 
Legislative Reference Library in Wisconsin is doing much to educate 
our lawgivers. But the fact still remains that of  all the industries of  the 
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United States lawmaking is perhaps the most backward.” The AALL, 
in his mind, extended and refined the ability of  expert commissions to 
advise government, and of  lawmakers to get the facts from experts.35
This active role, however, rested on a highly optimistic faith in 
the social-scientific community to reach consensus about real-world 
policy questions, as well as a conception of  the university as a public 
servant. These attitudes came very clearly to the fore in 1915, when 
the American Association of  University Professors made its famous 
“General Declaration of  Principles” concerning academic freedom. 
The committee which drafted the document, as rightly noted by Silva 
and Slaughter, had a significant plurality of  social scientists, with no 
outside disciplines sending multiple members.36 For our purposes, it is 
highly significant that E.R.A. Seligman chaired the committee, and that 
two other AALL presidents – Richard T. Ely and Henry W. Farnam 
– sat on it.37 The committee’s document vigorously defended the 
right of  professors to freedom of  inquiry both inside and outside the 
academy, basing its defense on the public role of  higher education. It 
first notes that the basis of  the university, with the exception of  some 
private universities, is as a “public trust.” It goes on to describe “the 
nature of  the academic calling” as a “social function,” which is “to 
impart the results of…investigation and reflection, both to students 
and to the general public, without fear or favor.”38 Finally, the role 
of  the university as an institution is through-and-through a social and 
political one:
The third function of  the modern university is to develop 
experts for the use of  the community. If  there is one thing that 
distinguishes the more recent developments of  democracy, it 
is the recognition by legislators of  the inherent complexities 
of  economic, social, and political life, and the difficulty of  
solving problems of  technical adjustment without technical 
knowledge…in almost every one of  our higher institutions of  
learning the professors of  the economic, social, and political 
sciences have been drafted to an increasing extent into more 
or less unofficial participation on the public service…To be 
of  use to the legislator or the administrator, he must enjoy 
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their complete confidence in the disinterestedness of  his 
conclusions.39
One could hardly imagine a better statement of  the AALL’s attitude 
toward academic involvement in public life: the disinterested pursuit 
of  objective standards for legislation by a community of  technical 
experts. Note that even after the AALL had made a routine practice 
of  lobbying Congress and state legislatures, drafting bills, writing 
editorials, and otherwise directly promoting their own legislation, they 
continued to insist on the disinterested nature of  their work.
the aall as prOtO-think tank:
With respect to the role of  special interests, several scholars bring 
up the issue of  possible corporate influence on the AALL. Silva and 
Slaughter maintain that the academic reform organizations of  the 
period were, if  not corporate shills, at least beholden to the “centralist” 
capitalist agenda of  the corporate order. They rely heavily on G. 
William Domhoff ’s variation of  C. Wright Mills’s “power elite” theory 
in this regard – in particular, noting that for more information on the 
AALL one should visit his book The Higher Circles.40 Most specifically, 
they note that organizations such as the National Civic Federation and 
the AALL counted names such as Rockefeller and Morgan among 
their donors.41 Indeed, for Silva and Slaughter the NCF characterizes 
the role of  the academic in public policy discussion: dominated by 
corporate money, and dedicated to mediation of  conflict within the 
existing order rather than effective social change.
Scholars who have researched the AALL in depth reject this 
corporate view of  the organization. Skocpol first of  all places the onus 
on Domhoff  and others to demonstrate the influence of  corporate 
money in the actual positions taken by the AALL; secondly notes 
that the AALL actually had “bitter conflict with…such business peak 
associations as the National Association of  Manufacturers [and] the 
National Civic Federation;” and thirdly suggests that the AALL mounted 
an effective social critique despite its acceptance of  capitalism.42 Moss 
corroborates the first point, contending that “there is no evidence 
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that they consciously catered their policy proposals to either [capital 
or labor].”43 That the AALL’s leadership had occasionally bitter fights 
with that of  other reform groups, both capital- and labor-centric, is 
well-documented. The fight over health insurance in particular, which 
will be discussed later, brought out differences between the AALL and 
other organizations, both capital- and labor-oriented.
Furthermore, a comparison of  the missions of  the AALL and the 
NCF will reveal significant differences between the two organizations. 
The NCF stated its aim “to organize the best brains of  the nation in 
an educational movement towards the solution of  some of  the great 
problems related to industrial and social progress…to aid thus in the 
crystallization of  the most enlightened public opinion; and when 
desirable, to promote legislation therewith.”44 The AALL’s mission 
statement, contained in Article II of  its constitution, enumerated 
three aims: “1. To serve as the American branch of  the International 
Association for Labor Legislation…2. To promote the uniformity of  
labor legislation in the United States. 3. To encourage the study of  
labor legislation.”45 In 1911, the third aim was amended to read “To 
encourage the study of  labor conditions in the United States with a 
view to promoting desirable labor legislation.”46
Evidently, the two groups placed discussion at the center of  their 
respective missions, and likewise analysis of  real-world conditions. 
The AALL additionally placed the promotion of  legislation at the 
center of  its mission, while the NCF located it peripherally. The AALL 
conceived of  itself  as a quasi-professional association, with a defined 
group of  experts addressing a defined problem: labor laws. The NCF, 
by contrast, outlined a vague program of  arranging “the best brains” to 
discuss “the great problems related to industrial and social progress.” 
While a broader mandate may initially appear to leave more room for 
effective critique and foundational questions, in fact the AALL’s well-
defined mission allowed it to position itself  as the singular source of  
expert judgment on the subject. This positioning further allowed the 
AALL to present its findings as expert consensus rather than as a high-
level debate.
It is all well and good that the academics of  the AALL could think 
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Photograph of  John R. Commons (1862-1945), undated. Im-
age courtesy US Department of  Labor. 
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of  themselves as a body of  experts in agreement about the plain facts 
of  the social order. But it is another matter to be presented that way 
in the papers. A survey of  the New York Times’s coverage of  AALL 
activities from the period 1905 to 1917 shows that while the paper 
did not perfectly conform its presentation of  the AALL with the 
organization’s self-conception, it did treat it more as a professional 
association than as a reform group. AALL positions, for example, 
are often presented as reports on academic conferences rather than 
as lobbying endeavors (although the Times did report bills when they 
were introduced). They are often reported on in conjunction with the 
American Economic Association or the American Sociological Society. 
Indeed, the treatment seems very similar to the treatment of  the other 
disciplinary associations. For example, over the period 1905 to 1917 
the American Association for Labor Legislation is mentioned in sixty-
six articles. The American Historical Association is mentioned seventy 
times, the American Economic Association fifty-nine, and the American 
Political Science Association thirty-one. By contrast, the National Civic 
Federation, the Consumers’ League, the Trade Union League, and the 
Municipal League are each mentioned in between 300 and 500 articles 
for the same period. By comparison, the most prominent professors 
associated with the AALL received between forty and sixty mentions.47 
The cause of  the discrepancy is that the different types of  organization 
were reported on for different reasons – in the case of  the professional 
organizations, to announce lectures and conferences, to receive an 
occasional expert quote, and to report on particular lobbying efforts.
Yet the AALL, whose leaders perceived it to be both a professional 
association and a reform group, would not fit into today’s public policy 
research typology. McGann identifies 10 axes along which to place 
public policy research institutions, concluding that to be a think tank an 
organization must be “‘nonprofit,’ ‘nongovernmental,’ ‘non-affiliated,’ 
and ‘non-degree-granting.’”48 The AALL did meet all of  these criteria, 
so it would fall within the scope of  McGann’s work. Yet it did not 
conform to patterns within that sample. Most importantly, it blurred 
the distinction observed by McGann between academic and policy 
orientations.
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 McGann contrasts the National Bureau of  Economic Research with 
the Heritage Foundation, describing the former as more academic and 
the latter more policy-oriented:
The National Bureau of  Economic Research, for example, is 
primarily interested in conducting applied research in economics 
that it hopes will have some relevance for policymakers, while 
the Heritage Foundation in Washington is primarily interested 
in conducting research that is directed toward influencing 
policy. This scholarly-versus-policy division can be seen in the 
staffing patterns of  these institutions. The National Bureau 
of  Economic Research is staffed entirely by academics with 
advanced degrees in economics and solid academic credentials 
and publication records, while the Heritage Foundation is 
staffed almost exclusively by young professionals and less well-
established scholars and is structured more like a newspaper 
than a university.49 
The AALL’s activities did not respect this distinction. While its 
staffing remained almost exclusively academic – even John B. Andrews, 
while not a professor, earned a PhD from Wisconsin under John R. 
Commons’s supervision – the organization did not restrict itself  to 
applied research. Indeed, the American Labor Legislation Review placed 
equal emphasis in its publications on policy recommendations and the 
distribution of  relevant statistics and news. The organization itself, 
of  course, conducted well-publicized lobbying efforts. In short, the 
AALL was like the NBER in its composition, like Heritage in its aims, 
and like both in its methods.
Secondly, the AALL did not broadcast to an academic audience 
in the way that the Brookings Institution does. McGann contrasts 
Brookings with the Cato institute, which “…relies more on ideological 
policy advocates than on the independent-minded academic types that 
Brookings relies on.”50 At the same time, “the [Brookings] research is 
used more by professors and students than by policymakers,” despite 
the stated objective of  the think tank to influence policy.51 The AALL’s 
authors consisted largely of  “academic types,” yet these were clearly 
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also policy advocates. Their publications may have circulated widely in 
academia, if  only because a great deal of  academics belonged to the 
AALL or similar organizations, but they primarily served others in the 
policy sphere.
Ultimately, then, it may be said that the leadership of  the AALL 
aimed not just to blur but to erase the academic-policy divide, on the 
basis of  the vision of  publicly responsible social science discussed 
above. This characteristic is primarily what distinguishes the AALL 
from most quasi-academic public policy research institutions operating 
today. As per its mission statement, its aimed to combine the “study 
of  labor conditions” and the “promotion of  desirable legislation” 
into one process.  Its leadership, primarily composed of  social science 
professors or statisticians working in government departments of  
labor, aimed not just to influence policy decisions through academic 
arguments, but to make policy an academic matter.
trOuBles
“They met with success, however, only when they operated within 
the nebulous realm of  acceptability established by capital and, to a 
lesser extent, by organized labor. When they moved outside that 
realm, they consistently failed to turn their model bills into law”52 
This statement reveals both the occasional ineffectiveness of  the 
AALL and its willingness to speak outside the boundaries of  normal 
discourse. Indeed, the group renowned for its early advocacy of  social 
insurance, and of  mandatory health insurance policies in particular, 
ought not to surprise us by the latitude of  its opinions with respect 
to its contemporaries. Rather, an examination of  the response to its 
boundary-crossing should help us to see more clearly the difficulties 
with the AALL’s vision of  a unified and academic policy process.
The failure of  the AALL to effectively promote social insurance and 
the minimum wage, among the more ambitious parts of  its program, 
had many causes. First among them was the perennial battle with the 
courts over the limits of  the states’ police powers. But not far behind 
was the AALL’s inability to position the opinion of  its scholars as 
definitive and representative of  expert consensus when it touched on 
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contentious issues. In the case of  phossy-jaw, much of  the coverage 
had consisted of  editorials by individuals or the newspaper in favor of  
proposed regulation, citing the AALL for support. “Horrors of  Lead 
Poisoning Astound Investigators” was a typical title for an article.53 
That same month, however, would see the title “Hotchkiss Doubtful 
of  State Insurance,” presaging the much more two-sided approach to 
emerge in the contested compulsory health insurance debate.54
Over the course of  the years 1916 and 1917, an intermittent debate 
raged over a compulsory health insurance bill introduced by Ogden L. 
Mills in the New York State legislature. The New York Times announced 
the bill on January 24, 1916, describing it as a joint effort of  the AALL 
and the American Medical Association. The article quotes the chair 
of  New York’s Industrial Commission that “the time is not far distant 
when a system of  health insurance will be devised by the Legislatures of  
the various states and by the Federal Government which will meet the 
needs of  our present social life.” According to the AALL’s statement, 
“much of  the best informed opinion of  the country is in favor of  
these proposals.” Henry R. Seager is also quoted, reminding the reader 
that the proposed legislation will help the United States to catch up to 
European countries that have already enacted similar measures.55 The 
AALL, in proposing compulsory health insurance, followed the same 
plan as before: draft a piece of  legislation in cooperation with relevant 
experts, position the bill as the product of  expert consensus, and use 
national efficiency rhetoric to stress the bill’s importance.
The response, however, was far from acquiescent. The first sign of  
dissent appeared in March, in the form of  a statement by Ralph Easley 
– chairman of  the NCF – blasting the bill for advancing the pecuniary 
interests of  doctors at the expense of  labor.56 Two days later, the New 
York Senate Judiciary Committee recommended that a commission be 
set up to investigate the possibility of  compulsory health insurance. 
Reporting on the hearing with the title “Health Insurance Plan Under 
Fire,” the New York Times stated that medical doctors did not support 
the bill for corrupt reasons – in fact, they opposed the bill as a restriction 
of  their rights. While the eruption of  debate was hardly according to 
plan, the recommendation of  a commission to investigate the bill’s 
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prospects – which was appointed in April57 – was even worse, running 
entirely counter to the function of  the AALL as legislative participant 
rather than mere advocate.
Moreover, the arguments raised by opponents of  the Mills bill 
frequently challenged the AALL’s expert status. When the New York 
Times gave Frank Dresser, a Massachusetts lawyer opposing the bill, 
an extended interview in which to explain his views, the profile’s 
author suggested that “There is perhaps no one in this country better 
prepared to discuss this question than Frank F. Dresser.” Moreover, 
Dresser focused not on legal but on economic issues, alleging that the 
bill would cost more than it saved – challenging the AALL on its own 
ground.58 The Society of  Medical Jurisprudence, in a report opposing 
the bill, described the AALL not as a professional organization but as 
a group “with which some eminent sociologists of  this country are 
connected in an advisory capacity.”59 The debate produced several 
alternative plans for better health insurance.60 When the bill finally 
reappeared before the Judiciary Committee in March of  1917, it met 
with “the widest possible divergence of  opinion as to [its] merits and 
demerits” and another investigatory committee was proposed.61 The 
story noted that “the bill probably will never come out of  committee,” 
and indeed it did not – nor did similar measures achieve any more 
success elsewhere.62
Samuel Gompers, who left the organization as a result of  the 
dispute, showed a particularly biting sense of  disdain for the AALL’s 
mission as well as its policies. Writing in the American Federationist, the 
American Federation of  Labor’s monthly magazine, he described the 
health insurance movement as paternalistic and arrogant and exhorted 
its advocates to recognize “one of  the difficult, important and heart-
breaking facts of  life – the limitations upon our capacity to help our 
fellows.”63 Of  the plan itself, he said, “It would inevitably build up a 
bureaucratic system which would be under the control and perhaps 
domination of  agents not directly responsible for the people.”64 The 
AALL could conceive of  such a plan because it operated on the 
defective “theory that the workers of  America are still in the condition 
where they must be led by some ‘intellectual.’”65 He wrote at length 
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against the very idea of  the expert:
They have a vision of  a new world with themselves as the 
creators. The work of  these creators and renovators has 
become commercialized and dignified by the title of  profession 
– they are experts – experts in social welfare, experts on 
home life, domestic relations, child life, and the thousand 
and one problems that arise out of  the lives of  the poor….
All [their] solutions are formulated along lines that necessitate 
governmental machinery and the employment of  experts…66
In 1906, Samuel Gompers had told the founders of  the AALL, “I 
need scarcely assure you that I am in sympathy with the purposes of  
the meeting” to establish the organization.67 Yet when the philosophy 
behind the AALL came to show itself  fully, he could not have been 
more fundamentally opposed. Gompers believed in an economic 
order defined by negotiation between interested parties, who had a 
right to deliberative self-determination – not by a cadre of  experts who 
could reach special knowledge through special training. He advanced 
personal rights claims against social justice claims.
Moss suggests several causes of  the health insurance proposal’s 
demise, including a high concentration and organization of  interests 
against it, poor timing with respect to World War I, and the voluntaristic 
ethic of  labor organizations.68 Skocpol highlights the divided structure 
of  United States government, with both federal-state-local and 
executive-legislative-judicial splits.69 All these explanations are valid, 
but it is important to emphasize the AALL’s signal failure in this debate 
to establish its expert position, which it had done successfully in less 
controversial cases. That the AALL was seen as just one group agitating 
among many undermined its entire premise. Moreover, in seeking the 
roles of  “skilled labor” for legislation and the surgeon for society, the 
AALL prompted a backlash against the existence of  those roles. On 
the one side, various other “experts” popped out of  the woodwork 
to challenge their numbers. On the other, labor advocates advanced 
claims that whatever the numbers, only the workmen themselves could 
determine what was best for labor.
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Photograph of  Samuel Gompers, 1911. Image courtesy Library 
of  Congress. 
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No reasonable definition of  Progressivism would exclude the AFL, 
the AALL, or (probably) the NCF. Indeed, while the NCF might be 
seen as an advocate of  business, neither the AALL nor the AFL could 
be described that way. That the AFL’s vision overtook that of  the 
AALL’s labor scholars, I believe, gives a sense of  the give and take 
within different Progressive strands. To follow Daniel Rodgers’s ever-
helpful model of  three rhetorics,70 the failure of  the health insurance 
movement represents a victory of  anti-monopoly rhetoric over 
efficiency rhetoric. Opponents, whether disinterested or not (mostly 
not), refused to accept the AALL’s claims to definitive expertise, 
challenging them for making those very claims as well as on the merits 
of  their arguments. Other opponents challenged the AALL’s claims to 
impartiality, or questioned the idea that legislation could be scientific 
enough to direct certain kinds of  economic activity. This general 
rebuff  demonstrates at least one instance in which a resistance to 
elite control trumped a support for social order, once the two were 
placed into conflict. In order for the academy to maintain its position 
of  authority, it could not speak with a unitary voice. Its reputation had 
to be distributed among the various scholars it credentialed, or else it 
would face resentment and resistance.
The American Association for Labor Legislation represented one 
possible step forward from the professional associations – the AEA, 
the ASS, the AHA, the APSA – that had splintered off  from the 
American Social Science Association in the preceding decades. It was 
sustained by a vision of  public policy in which each discipline could 
adequately maintain consensus about all relevant policy matters, to 
the degree that even the democratic process of  legislation could be 
considered scientific. Such an extreme vision was not likely to prevail 
even had the health insurance movement found victory. After all, 
internal disciplinary battles were prevalent then and would continue 
to be so. Such battles were vital to the perceived objectivity of  the 
social sciences.71 But it is not difficult to imagine a world with a much 
larger role for the university as an institution at the policy level. In such 
a world, phenomena such as the Chicago Boys of  the 1970s would 
be much more common. Schools of  thought would not only cluster 
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in departments but be represented by them in the public square – as 
professional activities and in discharge of  their scholarly duties. In the 
world that does exist, scholars move between academia and politics 
all the time, but as a matter of  full-time employment. In the AALL’s 
world, scholars would influence policy substantively from within the 
ivory tower.
The tendency for elite knowledge producers to assume control of  
national policy has waxed and waned over the subsequent course 
of  United States history. As the AALL’s failure shows, it has always 
faced anti-elitist opposition. One need not look as far back as the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations to see this dynamic at work. It 
is happening today, in the continued resistance to compulsory health 
insurance, and in the enormous backlash against the responses of  the 
Bush and Obama administrations to the economic crisis that began 
in 2008. Few can tell exactly how much those policies have helped 
employment or GDP numbers, but that is not the point. If  we pay 
attention to the historical efforts of  economists and social scientists 
to apply themselves to policy, we can see that the United States has 
resisted, from the first days of  those disciplines, the implementation 
of  economic policy by experts who are not answerable to the public. 
The test of  legitimacy has not been scholarly; it has been democratic.
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